Every platform action is classified before execution. The traffic light system, Safe-Stop sequence, and Decision Tower approval UI ensure that no Oracle production fix runs without the right level of human oversight.
Risk classification happens automatically at the point of triage — before any diagnostic script runs. The classification determines what happens at the end of the workflow: autonomous execution, auto-execution with rollback, or a full human approval gate.
The three-tier risk classification framework. Every Oracle action is classified before execution — the tier determines whether it runs autonomously, with a rollback window, or requires signed human approval.
Read-only diagnostic and reporting actions. No data is modified, no configuration is changed. The platform executes and delivers the augmented report directly to the user. No approval step.
Non-destructive management actions with no permanent data changes. Auto-execute with immediate effect, but an Instant Rollback button remains active for a configurable window (default: 30 minutes).
Any action touching production data, system configuration, or DDL-level database changes. The platform serializes complete state and holds indefinitely — no timeout path exists that auto-executes without a signed human decision.
When the LLM analysis identifies a High-Risk fix as the recommended resolution path, the platform immediately activates the Safe-Stop sequence — a five-step process that ensures no action executes without a signed human decision.
n8n immediately pauses the workflow at the HITL node. The complete fix context — diagnostic evidence, LLM reasoning path, proposed SQL, and Oracle Support Note reference — is serialized to the Postgres workflow state store. The workflow can wait here indefinitely without losing context.
n8n sends a structured notification to the designated approver via Slack or Teams. The notification contains three panels of evidence: the Problem (what is broken and how many records are affected), the AI Path (the diagnostic steps taken and root cause identified), and the Safety Check (the dry-run result of the proposed fix command).
The approver reviews the three-panel evidence and selects one of three options: Approve (execute the fix as shown), Reject (close the incident, no action taken), or Edit SQL (modify the proposed SQL before approval). Edit SQL requires the approver to submit the amended command, which is then shown for final confirmation before execution.
Upon approval, the signal carries a JWT authorization token. n8n validates this token before unpausing — preventing replay attacks where a captured approval signal is reused against a different fix request. The token is tied to the specific Request ID of this incident.
n8n unpauses and executes the exact SQL shown in the approval notification — no substitution. Immediately after execution, a signed audit record is written to the Postgres store capturing the complete fix event: agent identity, approver identity, exact SQL, Request ID, LLM reasoning summary, and before/after state.
The Decision Tower is the Slack or Teams message the approving DBA receives for every High-Risk fix request. Three panels of evidence. Three action buttons. Everything needed to make an informed decision without leaving the messaging tool.
The actual Slack notification the approving DBA receives — ORA-01652 incident, EBS R12.2.10 AP module, with three evidence panels and three action buttons.
ALTER DATABASE
TEMPFILE '/oracle/oradata/temp01.dbf'
RESIZE 10240M;
Dry run: No errors. Current size: 5120M. New size: 10240M.
Every platform action — autonomous or approved — generates a signed audit record in the Postgres store. The schema is designed to satisfy SOX Section 404 and ITGC Change Management controls for system-level modifications.
| Field | Value (ORA-01652 Example) | SOX / ITGC Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| request_id | REQ-2026-0147 | Unique identifier linking the incident, diagnostic output, approval decision, and fix execution into a single auditable event. |
| executing_agent | oracle-ai-platform/n8n | Identity of the automated agent that executed the fix — satisfies the requirement to attribute every system change to a named actor. |
| approving_admin | jsmith@company.com | Identity of the human who approved the High-Risk fix — JWT-verified at execution time, not self-reported. |
| approval_timestamp | 2026-02-26T14:31:22Z | Exact time of the signed human decision — satisfies the requirement for a datable approval event in the change record. |
| sql_executed | ALTER DATABASE TEMPFILE ... RESIZE 10240M | The exact SQL command that ran — not a description, not a summary. Verbatim. The DBA approved exactly this. |
| llm_reasoning_summary | TEMP tablespace at 99.8%. 50 AP invoices blocked. Root cause confirmed via SYS-03. MOS Note 123456.1 applied. | Documents the AI reasoning chain that led to the fix recommendation — enables post-incident review of the platform's decision path. |
| state_before | {"tablespace":"TEMP","used_pct":99.8,"bytes_free":41943040} | Captured system state immediately before execution — enables before/after comparison and supports rollback if needed. |
| state_after | {"tablespace":"TEMP","used_pct":49.2,"bytes_free":5242880000} | Captured system state immediately after execution — confirms the fix had the intended effect and documents the change boundary. |
| oracle_doc_reference | MOS Note 123456.1 | Cites the Oracle-validated knowledge source that supported the fix recommendation — links the internal decision to an authoritative external reference. |
| jwt_token_hash | sha256:a3f9... | Cryptographic proof that the approval signal was not replayed from a prior incident — satisfies integrity requirements for approval-gated change records. |
SOX and ITGC controls require that the person who requests a change cannot be the same person who approves and executes it. The platform enforces this architecturally.
Submits the incident via the support portal. Has no visibility into the diagnostic results, the LLM reasoning, or the proposed fix — only receives the resolution confirmation after the fix is applied and verified.
Executes read-only diagnostic scripts via a restricted schema. Cannot write to the database through the diagnostic connection. Cannot approve its own fix recommendations. Cannot modify the proposed SQL before presenting it to the approver.
Reviews the Decision Tower evidence and approves or rejects the proposed fix. Cannot modify the diagnostic scripts, cannot influence the LLM reasoning output, and cannot execute fixes without the platform's approval workflow — no direct production database access outside the governed path.
Read-only access to the signed audit record store. Can query the complete history of every platform action, every approval decision, and every system state change — with the exact SQL executed and the JWT-verified approver identity for every High-Risk event.
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